A solution f for cooperative games is a minimum norm solution, if the space of games has a norm such that f (v) minimizes the distance (induced by the norm) between the game v and the set of additive games. We show that each linear solution having the inessential game property is a minimum norm solution. Conversely, if the space of games has a norm, then the minimum norm solution w.r.t. this norm is linear and has the inessential game property. Both claims remain valid also if solutions are required to be efficient. A minimum norm solution, the least square solution, is given an axiomatic characterization.
Introduction
The games we analyze are the familiar n -person cooperative games with side payments. A solution is a function f that to each game v assigns an additive game f (v). Additive games are like (signed) measures: each player is given a payoff, and the payoff to a coalition is just the sum of the payoffs of the players in that coalition. Additive games are also called "inessential games".
A solution f has the inessential game property, if the solution to any additive game p is that game itself: f (p) = p. A solution f is linear, if it is additive (f (v + w) = f (v) + f (w)), and satisfies f (av) = af (v) for all real numbers a.
A solution f is a minimum norm solution, if the space of games has a norm such that f (v) minimizes the distance (induced by the norm) between the game v and the set of additive games. We show that each linear solution having the inessential game property is a minimum norm solution. Conversely, if the space of games has a norm, then the minimum norm solution w.r.t. this norm is linear and has the inessential game property. Both claims remain valid also if solutions are required to be efficient. We consider only norms that can be derived from some inner product. Some of the best known solutions for cooperative games, such as the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value, satisfy linearity and have the inessential game property. Classes of solutions such as semivalues (Dubey, Neyman and Weber (1981) and least square values Zarzuelo (1996, 1998) ) satisfy these conditions as well. So all these solutions are minimum norm solutions. We characterize axiomatically one of the least square values defined by Zarzuelo (1996, 1998) .
Minimum norm solutions have some intuitive appeal. All information about players' importance, influence or power is given by the function v that represents the game. The payoff f (v) i to player i should presumably reflect the importance of this player in v as closely as possible. In other words, a solution f (v) should be a best possible representation of v among the additive games. Minimizing the distance between a game and the set of its possible solutions is one possible way to formalize this idea.
The plausibility of solutions is often judged by investigating the axioms the solutions satisfy. The linearity property satisfied by the minimum norm solutions has received some criticism in the literature. If we don't accept linearity, we cannot find the idea behind the minimum norm solutions very interesting either. Conversely, if linearity is accepted as a reasonable axiom, then minimum norm solutions should be accepted as well. Unless, of course, one cannot accept the inessential game property. But this is probably one of the least controversial axioms discussed in the literature.
The paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2 notation is introduced. Main results are given in Section 3. The least square solution is axiomatized in Section 4. Section 5 contains some remarks.
Preliminaries
Given a nonempty finite player set N = {1, . . . , n}, an n -person cooperative game is a function v that assigns to each coalition S ⊂ N a real number v(S) A game v ∈ V is additive, if v(S) = i∈S v i , for all S ⊂ N . We denote by
A the set of all additive n -person games, and note that it is a linear subspace
A solution to n -person cooperative games is a function f : V −→ A that to each game v associates an additive game f (v). The best-known solution is the Shapley value φ:
for all i ∈ N , where s = |S| denotes the cardinality of coalition S. Let π : N −→ N be any bijection. To each v ∈ V define a game πv by
Shapley value is the only solution f on V satisfying the following four conditions (Shapley 1953; Winter 2002) . The conditions must hold for every game v ∈ V, but we don't repeat this in the statements of the conditions.
, for all i ∈ N , and any bijection
Another well-known solution is the Banzhaf value β:
for all i ∈ N . It satisfies all the properties mentioned above except efficiency.
Both the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value satisfy the following linearity condition, which is a bit stronger than additivity.
Both the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value satisfy the following three conditions. A6. (Inessential game) f (v) = v, for all additive games v.
A7. (Coalitional mononicity) If v(S) > w(S) and v(T ) = w(T ) for all
The core C(v) of a game v consists of additive games x ∈ A such that x(N ) = v(N ) and x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊂ N . In general the core may be empty, but the Shapley value is in the core of any convex game.
Given an inner product ·, · on V, consider the following problem for each
( 1) This is of course the same as minimizing the norm
with the same restrictions.
Theorem 1 For each v ∈ V, the solution f (v) to the problem (1) exists uniquely. The function f : V −→ A is efficient, linear and has the inessential game property.
and note that M (v) is a linear manifold in A. By the Classical Projection
Theorem (Luenberger 1969, p.51) , the programme (1) has a unique solution f (v), and f (v) is the only p ∈ M (v) having the property
The solution f is efficient by definition. If p ∈ A and w = v + p, then clearly f (w) = f (v) + p, so f has the inessential game property.
Let w = v+v for some v ∈ V. We want to show that
to establish additivity of f . So it suffices to show that equation (2) holds for all q ∈ M (w), when v in that equation is replaced by v + v and p is replaced
. Take an arbitrary p ∈ M (v), and note that q − p ∈ M (v ),
With these substitutions, the left hand side of equation (2) gets the following form:
The first term of the sum on the right hand side of this equation is zero, (1) is then obtained by taking the orthogonal projection of p(v) w.r.t. ·, · into
Our next result states that to any linear solution f that has the inessential game property, there is an inner product ·, · such that f (v) solves (1) for all games v. We need some new notation. Let A ⊥ be the orthogonal complement of A with respect to the dot product. That is,
0, for all p ∈ A}. Any game v ∈ V can be uniquely expressed as the sum
Theorem 2 Let f : V −→ A be any efficient linear solution that has the inessential game property. Then there is an inner product ·, · such that
Proof. A game v can be expressed as a sum v = v ⊥ + p v in a unique way,
The projection map v −→ v ⊥ is linear, so there is a matrix
Since f is a linear solution, it has a matrix F :
This is an inner product, since the matrix F T F + Q T Q is symmetric and positive definite. Symmetry is clear, so let us check positive definiteness.
Let v be any game such that v(S) = 0 for at least one coalition S. Then 
, and ·, · is an inner product on V.
Take any game v. Then
since f is linear and has the inessential game property. If p = f (v) is an arbitrary additive game, then 4 Least square values Zarzuelo (1996, 1998 ) study least square values, which they define in the following way. Let m ∈ V be a nonnegative game (vector) such that m(S) > 0 for some S, and m(S) = m(T ) if |S| = |T |. Given a game v ∈ V and weights m, the least square value L m solves the following minimization problem;
A solution is a least square value, if and only if it satisfies efficiency, linearity, symmetry, inessential game, and coalitional monotonicity (Ruiz, Valenciano and Zarzuelo 1998, Theorem 8, p.116) . Symmetry is a slightly weaker condition than anonymity: the result is true also if symmetry is replaced by anonymity. Note that the least square solutions belong to the class of minimum norm solutions of Section 3.
If the weights for all coalitions are the same, then the solution to formula To characterize L (andβ) we need the following axiom.
A9. (Average coalitional monotonicity) If
This axiom says that the average value of coalitions containing i is less than the average value of coalitions containing j, then the solution should not give to i more payoff than to j. Let u be the uniform game:
Theorem 3 L is the only solution satisfying efficiency, additivity, inessen-tial game and average coalitional monotonicity.
Proof. (i) L satisfies the axioms. Since L is a least square solution, it is efficient, additive and has the inessential game property. Because L =β, L satisfies the average coalitional monotonicity, if and only if the Banzhaf value β satisfies this axiom as well.
The Banzhaf value β is additive, and has the inessential game property.
That is, the Banzhaf value of v ⊥ divides the sum
between players.
Let v be a game such that S i v(S) < S j v(S). By the previous
. Each player i belongs to 2 n−1 coalitions, and each j = i belongs to half of these coalitions. But S⊂N p(S) = 2 n−1 p(N ) for all additive games p implies So by the average coalitional monotonicity, (1) Keane (1969) has shown that the Shapley value satisfies the minimization problem (4) for appropriately chosen weights m(S). Hence the Shapley value is a least square value and therefore a minimum norm solution.
(2) It is well known that the Shapley value is always in the core of a convex game. This is not a general property of efficient minimum norm solutions as we show in the next example. 
